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In the present study, we examine the effect of plausibility violations in a virtual environment
(VE) on spatial presence. After reviewing research on the association between plausibility
and spatial presence, we present a dual-systems approach to understanding the effect
of plausibility (or violations thereof) on spatial presence. We conceptualize the feeling
of being present in a VE as a lower-order cognitive process. Perceptions of plausibility
violations might represent higher-order cognitive processes that could interfere with
spatial presence. We present data from an experimental study in which we manipulated
the external consistency (i.e., the plausibility) of the VE, cognitive load (to interfere
with higher-order cognitive processes), and immersion to examine its effect on spatial
presence. Results show that immersion was the most important factor driving the
presence experience. We found no difference between low and high plausibility in
spatial presence. Subsequent equivalence tests showed that the group exposed to
the implausible VE did not feel less present than the group exposed to the plausible
VE. We discuss the findings of our studies in light of our theoretical considerations and
previous research.
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INTRODUCTION
The present paper examines the influence of the perceived plausibility of a virtual environment
(VE) on users’ experience of spatial presence. There is growing consensus in the literature that
spatial presence, or users’ sense of “being there” in a VE, represents a cognitive feeling (Schubert,
2009) or a perceptual illusion (Slater, 2009) that strongly hinges on the sensorimotor contingencies
supported by the VE (Cummings and Bailenson, 2015). Based on a meta-analysis of 85 empirical
studies, Cummings and Bailenson (2015, p. 272) found that particular technological factors such as
“levels of user-tracking, the use of stereoscopic visuals, and wider fields of view of visual displays”
contribute to the sensation of spatial presence. Whereas these findings suggest that spatial presence
might be an automatically triggered sensation that is primarily determined by the technological
features of the VE, scholars have otherwise proposed that higher-order cognitive user processes
might also play a role in the formation of spatial presence (e.g., higher-order cognitive involvement;
Wirth et al., 2007).
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Users potentially engage in higher-order cognitive operations
in order to judge the credibility/plausibility (Rovira et al., 2009;
Slater, 2009; Skarbez, 2016) or perceived realism of the VE (Baños
et al., 2000; Schubert et al., 2001; McGloin et al., 2011). These
subjective judgments, in turn, might affect how users respond
to the VE, including their experience of spatial presence. For
example, Slater (2009) proposed that spatial presence (addressed
as “place illusion” or the “sensation of being in a real place”,
p. 3549) and plausibility (“the overall credibility of the scenario
being depicted in comparison with expectations”, p. 3549) are
two orthogonal user experiences. That is, the two experiences
are conceptually different and both shape the extent to which
users behave realistically in a VE. Others suggest that plausibility,
alternatively interpreted as the consistency of a virtual scene
(Riecke et al., 2005; Skarbez, 2016), authenticity (Gilbert, 2017),
or the overall perceived realism of a VE (e.g., Schubert et al., 2001;
Shafer et al., 2011;Welch et al., 1996; Lombard and Ditton, 1997),
might also directly affect a user’s spatial presence experience.
The present approach contributes to the debate about
how perceived plausibility might shape users’ spatial presence
experiences. More specifically, we echo the idea previously
expressed by Slater (2009) that plausibility and spatial presence
are two conceptually separate concepts. However, adapting a
psychological dual-system logic, according to which human
beings process information in two distinct brain systems
(e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013), we interpret both concepts
as conceptually separate yet causally linked. We argue that
spatial presence represents a cognitive feeling (Schubert, 2009)
resulting from highly automatic processing (often referred to
as system 1 processing, e.g., Hartmann, 2011, 2013), whereas
perceived plausibility represents an outcome of (more deliberate)
higher-order cognitive processing (often referred to as system
2 processing, e.g., Hartmann, 2011, 2013). Furthermore, we
propose that the perception of plausibility is a contributing, yet
not necessary, factor of spatial presence. That is, users might feel
spatially present in a VE because of system 1 processing without
ever engaging in higher-order cognitive plausibility operations;
however, once they do engage in these system 2 operations,
their resulting plausibility judgment might modulate their feeling
of spatial presence in a top-down fashion. Accordingly, in
the present approach, we inspect how users’ feeling of spatial
presence differ depending on the (perceived) plausibility of
the VE.
To our knowledge, although several studies provided
important preliminary evidence on how users’ plausibility
perceptions might affect their feeling of spatial presence (e.g.,
Welch et al., 1996; Slater et al., 2009; McGloin et al., 2011), to date
no rigorous experimental study has tested this link. Therefore,
with the present approach, we aim to extend previous theoretical
and empirical research that already linked perceived plausibility
(or perceived realism) to spatial presence. The present approach
features an experimental study. Participants navigated through a
virtual house with objects (e.g., furniture) being arranged either
in a plausible or implausible way in order to manipulate how
plausible or realistic users would find the environment. Using
self-reports, we assessed how this manipulation affected users’
feeling of being spatially present in the virtual environment.
In the remainder of the present paper, we first review the
different conceptualizations of plausibility in communication
research. Next, we discuss research on the effects of plausibility
(or the lack thereof) on presence. Based on dual-process theories
(e.g., Evans and Stanovich, 2013), we then outline our rationale
about how to theoretically grasp plausibility assessments and
their relationship to the experience of spatial presence. Finally, we
present data from an experimental study and discuss the results
in light of our theoretical rationale.
PLAUSIBILITY IN PRESENCE RESEARCH
According to Skarbez (2016), the plausibility of a virtual
environment is closely tied to its consistency and the extent
it meets user’s expectations. More specifically, Skarbez argues
that virtual environments appear plausible to the extent they
feature “state of affairs [...] that [are] self-evident given prior
knowledge” (p. 7). Users’ prior knowledge entails (a) what they
know about the real world, as well as (b) what they know
about the (potentially fictional) world featured by the virtual
environment. Accordingly, two types of plausibility can be
distinguished, as “the story world may be unlike the actual
world or the story may be incoherent” (Busselle and Bilandzic,
2008, p. 267). These two types of plausibility can be termed
internal and external plausibility. Both types of plausibility have
been discussed in the literature in different disciplines and
various research domains. Importantly, both types of plausibility
represent important dimensions of users’ perceived realism (for
overviews, see Popova, 2010; Hall, 2017).
Internal plausibility (also addressed as internal realism,
Popova, 2010, or narrative realism, Busselle and Bilandzic, 2008)
refers to the extent to which the environment is consistent within
itself or with respect to the expectations raised by its genre. For
example, a science fiction environment might appear internally
plausible if it consistently portrays a certain alien race to be
able to fly, or if users first learn they are able to fly themselves,
and the environment continues to allow users to fly unless
providing a strong (narrative) argument against it. According to
Busselle and Bilandzic (2008), internal realism is violated if new
information in a story contradicts already presented information.
For instance, imagine a character in a story who is introduced as
a vegetarian. It would be internally inconsistent (or incoherent)
if this character would eat a cheeseburger in a later scene unless
his or her transition from vegetarian to carnivore is explained
somewhere in between. In terms of the example outlined above,
if a user of a VE was not informed that her avatar or other
characters were able to fly, internal realism of the VR would be
violated if flying aliens appear or the avatar lifts off into flight.
External plausibility (also addressed as probability, Popova,
2010, or external realism, Busselle and Bilandzic, 2008) refers
to how consistent the virtual environment is to users’ real-
world knowledge. Essentially, external plausibility refers to the
general question of whether something portrayed in a mediated
message—from spoken statements to movies, TV news, and
virtual environments—could occur in the real world (Hall, 2017).
External plausibility converges with Lombard andDitton’s (1997)
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notion of social realism, defined as “the extent to which a media
portrayal is plausible or ‘true to life’ in that it reflects events
that do or could occur in the non-mediated world.” A virtual
environment is externally plausible if it features, according to
the subjective notion of users, realistic settings (e.g., an authentic
display of a living room, a house, or a city like Paris) and
behavior (e.g., expectable functionality of displayed objects, such
as being able to open a door and look through a window).
External plausibility is expressed in users’ global judgment that,
“this is realistic or authentic.” More specifically, it can be
expressed in users’ judgment that something is factually true or
accurate (Popova, 2010). However, if users are uncertain about
the factual existence of displayed locations or people, external
plausibility can also be expressed in judgments that things in the
environment appear to be highly likely, probable, or typical in
the real world (Busselle and Greenberg, 2000; Shapiro and Chock,
2003).
In the present study, we focus on external plausibility. We do
this for three reasons: (1) Whereas internal plausibility deals with
the coherence of a story or the mediated world (e.g., a vegetarian
does not eat cheeseburgers), external plausibility judgments arise
from a comparison between the fictional or mediated world with
the real or unmediated world. Therefore, one might argue that
external plausibility represents a more generic type of the two.
(2) Looking at research on the effects of plausibility (see below)
on spatial presence we find that most studies have examined
some form of external plausibility. Thus, in order to continue
this line of research, we also focus on this form of plausibility
(violations). Finally, (3) in order to experimentally test the
effect of plausibility (or violations thereof) on spatial presence,
examining the effect of external plausibility allows for a more
straightforward experimental manipulation than studying the
effect of internal plausibility.
The Impact of External Plausibility on
Spatial Presence
Previous research provided tentative and partly mixed evidence
that users’ perceptions of external plausibility or realism might
affect their sense of spatial presence. A first group of studies
provides correlational evidence for a link between users’ sense
of external plausibility or realism and spatial presence. Shafer
et al. (2011) conducted two experiments to illuminate the effects
of interactivity on video game experience. In this context (and
independent from their actual experimental test), they observed a
(sometimes) strong positive correlation between users’ perceived
realism and their sense of spatial presence. However, their
assessment of perceived realism included more dimensions
(e.g., identity, utility, and perceptual fidelity) than just external
plausibility—and possibly these other dimensions triggered the
observed association with spatial presence. Similarly, McGloin
et al. (2011) found that participants’ perceptions of a video game’s
realism (graphics and sound) were positively correlated with
their sense of feeling spatially present in the game. Other types
of correlational studies focus on the development of self-report
scales of spatial presence. These studies suggest an association
between perceived realism and spatial presence by interpreting
perceived realism as a (sub) dimension of spatial presence based
on factor-analytic examinations. For example, the popular Igroup
presence questionnaire (IPQ, Schubert et al., 2001) builds on
the logic (and empirical observation) that perceived realism
and spatial presence are positively associated. That is, both the
perceived realism and the feeling of being spatially present in
a mediated environment constitute the presence experience.
Similarly, the Temple Presence Inventory (Lombard et al., 2009)
builds on the idea that perceived realism and spatial presence are
positively related.
A second group of studies reports the direct effects of
experimentally manipulated plausibility or realism on spatial
presence. Two studies reported by Welch et al. (1996) showed
that driving a car in a “high realism” version of a virtual
environment (e.g., featuring a blue sky, hilly road surface and
surround, or oncoming cars) results in higher spatial presence as
compared to the “low realism” version (e.g., featuring black sky,
a flat surface and surrounding, and no oncoming cars). However,
in both reported studies, the effect of realism on presence, if
compared to the other factors examined (e.g., interactivity and
response-time lag), was rather small. The authors, accordingly,
concluded that, “it is not surprising perhaps that pictorial realism
appeared to have little effect on presence since it would seem
likely that even a completely unfamiliar environment (e.g., a
room filled with random dots) could produce a strong sense of
presence” (p. 270). Another experimental study by Regenbrecht
and Schubert (2002) returned a small effect of perceived
plausibility on spatial presence; however, results were not
statistically significant. In this study, plausibility wasmanipulated
as the perceived ability to interact with characters in a virtual
environment. Notably, although the researchers manipulated
perceived plausibility by telling some participants they could
interact with virtual environment characters, participants were
unable to actually interact with other characters. This may have
contributed to the reported weak findings.
In another experiment (Krcmar et al., 2011), participants
played either Doom 1 or Doom 3 as a manipulation of
video game realism. Participants perceived Doom 3 as more
realistic and reported a stronger spatial presence experience
than participants that were playing Doom 1. Ivory and
(Ivory and Kalyanaraman, 2007) obtained similar results in
a closely related experiment. However, while both studies
suggest an impact of perceived realism on presence, comparing
older vs. more recent titles of a video game series might
also introduce potential confounds such a greater pace or
smoother gameplay of the newer game that might plausibly
affect spatial presence. Another experiment by Bouchard
et al. (2012) circumvented this problem by manipulating
subjective realism despite applying a single VR scenario, a
room featuring a mouse in a cage. In the experimental
condition, participants were “led to believe that they were
connected in real time with [the room as] a remote location
that was digitized live” (p. 229), whereas in the control
condition, participants thought they were exposed to a virtual
copy of the room. As compared to the control condition,
participants reported significantly stronger spatial presence in the
experimental condition.
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A third set of studies examined plausibility violations in
research on breaks in presence. Breaks in presence (BIP) occur
when users stop responding to the mediated environment and
instead start responding to their real (i.e., the unmediated)
environment (Slater and Steed, 2000). Liebold et al. (2016)
consider BIPs as “instances where the user is distracted from
the VE by external stimuli or where predictions derived from
the user’s mental models are inconsistent with the actual
outcome in the VE” (p. 480). Brogni et al. (2003) observed
that more BIPs result in lower spatial presence, whereas a
study by Spagnolli and Gamberini (2002) suggests that technical
anomalies in a mediated environment do not necessarily lead
to BIPs, but that users try to integrate these anomalies into
their experience.
However, in a qualitative study, Garau et al. (2008) confronted
participants four times with a technical anomaly (a screen
whiteout) while navigating a VE. Results suggest that these
technical anomalies lead to BIPs. Based on focus group and
survey results, Liebold et al. (2016) point to more subtle factors
triggering BIPs, such as invisible walls, bad co-player behavior
in a video game, or floating objects in a room. In contrast
to technical anomalies or interface problems, these content-
related factors are more akin to what Skarbez et al. (2017)
refer to as coherence of the VR and the present notion of
perceived realism or external plausibility. Finally, a study by
Sjoelie et al. (2014) examined the effect of expectation violations
that are “related to a mismatch between your subjective mental
reality and the virtual reality” on brain activity and behavior
in a VR environment. These expectation violations, which
can be interpreted as plausibility (i.e., external plausibility)
violations, led to increased activation of brain regions that
have been associated with decision-making in uncertain or ill-
structured situations. The authors interpret this increase with a
re-evaluation of a given situation due to expectation violations.
In addition, the authors report decreased movement within the
VR during plausibility violations.
In sum, there seem to be three groups of studies that deal with
the effects of (or the associations between) plausibility violations
and the sense of presence. However, looking at each group, we
find mixed correlational evidence, different notions of realism
across studies, and different methodological approaches. Thus,
we still need further (theoretical) insight into whether external
plausibility (i.e., perceived realism) affects spatial presence.
The Current Approach: Presence vs.
Plausibility From a Dual-System Approach
In the present approach, we interpret users’ sensation of being
spatially present as well as their perception of plausibility
(or perceived realism) within a psychological dual-system
information processing approach (for related ideas, see
Hartmann, 2011, 2012; Shapiro and Kim, 2012; Krcmar and
Eden, 2017). This perspective builds on the psychological notion
that reasoning can take place in two distinct brain systems, one
system triggering intuitions, another one enabling reflections
and deliberation. More specifically, “intuition (system 1) is fast
and automatic, giving rise to feelings of confidence [...] but with
no conscious knowledge of the basis of these feelings. Reflective
processing (system 2) is slower, involving manipulation of
representations through working memory [...]. However,
reflective processing does not necessarily override or correct
faulty intuitions” (Evans and Stanovich, 2013, p. 18). Departing
from the initial focus on reasoning, scholars in psychology
also related the dual-processing logic to other domains such
as emotions and, more closely related to the present approach,
perception (Kahneman, 2003).
It is commonly assumed that presence results from effectively
provided sensorimotor contingencies, based on the immersive
capacities of the underlying media technology (Cummings and
Bailenson, 2015). Schubert (2009) proposed to conceptualize
presence as a cognitive feeling, i.e., “a feedback from unconscious
cognitive processes that informs conscious thought about the
state of the spatial cognitive system” (p. 161). Following these
notions, we consider presence an output of fast and effortless
system 1 processing that is either closely tied to (Kahneman,
2003) or includes perceptual information (Herschbach, 2015).
We conceptualize spatial presence as the intuition or gut feeling
of users of being physically located in a mediated environment.
As a quickly arising gut feeling within system 1, presence might
strongly depend on sensory input from the underling media
technology that feeds into hard-wired or heavily trained laws of
spatial perception (Cummings and Bailenson, 2015).
However, users’ cognitive elaborations of the environment
might also affect presence (e.g., Wirth et al., 2007; Hofer
et al., 2012). In the present approach, we consider related
higher-order cognitive elaborations as representing system 2
processing. That is, they are cognitively more taxing (drawing
on working memory and causing cognitive load) and they
are slower than the perceptual processes initially triggering
presence. Plausibility operations can be conceptualized as typical
higher-order cognitive activity or system 2 processing. They
require a certain effort and attention, and might be interrupted
by secondary tasks. We conceptualize plausibility assessments
as higher-order cognitive processes because in plausibility
operations, users must cognitively represent the environment
and compare this representation to what they know about the
real world (external consistency) or scrutinize it for internal
inconsistencies (Popova, 2010). Because human beings are
cognitive misers, they only engage in system 2 processing,
including plausibility operations, when necessary (as in default-
interventionist dual-process models; Evans and Stanovich, 2013).
One typical case is if system 1 processing faces perceptual
problems, as in encounters of unfamiliar or puzzling stimuli, that
might require further cognitive elaboration in order to be solved
(e.g., Weber and Wirth, 2014).
In line with this notion, we expect users to engage in system
2 plausibility operations if they encounter virtual scenes that
appear unfamiliar or puzzling (i.e., not plausible). The outcome
of the operation is a judgment on the environment’s plausibility.
Once this “perceived plausibility” has been defined, it might
intervene in or revise the outcomes of system 1 processing. While
the intervention potential of system 2 processing on system 1
processing has been shown with respect to correcting intuitions
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013) or regulating emotions (Gross,
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2001), the ability to correct system 1 outcomes linked to more
perceptual sensations like optical illusions is more contested.
Many scholars agree that optical illusions (like seeing two lines
of different length in the famous Mueller-Lyer illusion), for
example, are cognitively impenetrable (Kahneman, 2013). “No
amount of insight derived from education or experience can free
us from optical illusions” (Tryon, 2014, p. 144).
However, the perceptual experience of spatial presence in
VE, and the cognitive feelings underlying this illusion, might
resemble a more complex system 1 output than the simple
perception of line length like in the Mueller-Lyer illusion.
Accordingly, presence might not be determined by “hard-wired”
automatic perceptual processes, but might be partly penetrable by
top-down cognitive influences, including plausibility judgments.
In light of the current debate, the power of plausibility judgments
to affect the cognitive feeling of presence clearly deserves
further empirical scrutiny. Accordingly, in the current study, we
manipulated the external plausibility of a virtual environment
and tested effects of this plausibility manipulation on feelings of
spatial presence.
THE CURRENT STUDY
The overarching question of the present paper is whether
plausibility as a system 2 process can influence spatial presence
as a system 1 impression/feeling. Our core hypothesis, thus, is
that presence is lower if users perceive a virtual environment
as implausible as compared to a plausible version of the same
environment (H1). In this study, we are also testing two potential
moderators of this effect. First, if plausibility really builds on a
system 2 process, pondering plausibility and regulating system
1 processes based on plausibility might be cognitively taxing.
An individual user’s ability to devote cognition to plausibility
judgments is not infinite, however, and may be limited by
cognitive load. Hence, the effectiveness of regulating system 1
processes, like the sensation of presence, based on system 2
plausibility judgments might be reduced if the cognitive system
is already under load due to other tasks (see Krcmar and
Eden, 2017, for similar reasoning). Accordingly, the proposed
regulating effect of plausibility on presence should be diminished
if users are under cognitive load (H2).
Second, the stronger the presence illusion, the harder it
might be to break it. Hence, the ability of plausibility to
regulate presence might also depend on the intensity of
presence as a system 1 output, which hinges—as a hard-
wired automatic process—strongly on the immersive quality
of the input. For example, perceived implausibility might
reduce the sensation of being present in a mental imagery
space, as when readers are transported into the story world
of a book (Busselle and Bilandzic, 2008), but the regulating
effect of perceived implausibility might be diminished if users
experience intense perceptual illusions of presence (e.g., triggered
by immersive technology like VR). In general, the regulating
effect of plausibility on presence might be diminished for highly
immersive spatial environments (that trigger more intense spatial
presence) as compared to less immersive environments (that
trigger less intense spatial presence) (H3). We put these three
hypotheses to test in a lab experiment.
METHOD
The experimental study employed a 2 (plausibility of
environment: high vs. low) × 2 (immersion of environment:
high/head-mounted display vs. low/screen-only) × 2 (cognitive
load: high vs. low) between-subjects design. A total of 195
undergraduate students at a large Midwestern university
participated in the study (nfemale = 118, Mage = 21.14, SDage =
6.86) and were randomly assigned to conditions. The study was
approved by an institutional review board.
Procedure
Participants were greeted by the research assistant and given
an informed consent form. After signing the form, participants
received an explanation of the study procedure. They were
told that they would play a video game in which they should
walk through a virtual house. After that, participants were
randomly assigned to either sit in front of a 23 inch monitor
(n = 93) or to be equipped with an Oculus Rift DK2 R© head
mounted display (HMD; n = 102). Following that, the research
assistant started the simulation and told the participant that
they would have a short practice session of 1min to familiarize
themselves with the game controls (i.e., the mouse and the
arrow keys, which were used by all participants to move around
within the computer simulation). After this practice session,
within the computer-generated environment participants were
automatically transferred to the second floor of the virtual house.
They were told that they could freely explore the environment
for 4min. Then, the research assistant left the room. After 5min,
the assistant came back and told the participants to take off
the HMD and the headphones and open the browser window
with the questionnaire assessing the dependent variables. Finally,
participants were debriefed and dismissed.
Stimulus
We used a computer simulation of a house with two floors.
The simulation was programmed with the Unity Game Engine
(Version 5.5.0f3). The first floor consists of an entrance area that
leads to a living room/kitchen area. The second floor consists of a
bathroom with a bathtub, a bedroom with a bed and a dressing
table with a chair, a children’s room with a crib, and an office
roomwith an office table and a home trainer. The plausibility and
the cognitive load factors were manipulated within the stimulus.
Plausibility was manipulated in terms of the notion of external
consistency (Skarbez, 2016). More precisely, we manipulated
the physical behavior of objects and the appearance of the
environment: In the implausible condition (Figure 1, left; n =
96), the bathroom sink, bathtub, and toilet were upside down.
In the bedroom, the bed, the dressing table, and the chair rotated
continuously and were attached to the wall instead of standing
on the floor. The objects in the children’s room spontaneously
shrunk and enlarged, snow fell in the office room and the floor
seemed to be made of running water. Participants in the group
with high plausibility (Figure 1, right; n = 99) walked through a
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FIGURE 1 | The example images from the implausible (left) and plausible (right) virtual house.
house with rooms that one would expect to find in a typical house
without any of the aforementioned implausible objects. The
plausibility manipulation in this particular virtual environment
has been validated in two previous studies. Lee et al. (2019) found
that viewers (n = 22) looked longer (49 vs. 1 s) at objects in
the implausible vs. the plausible conditions (see Lee et al., 2019,
Figure 3), suggesting that the implausible environment requires
more effortful processing. In a separate sample, a thematic
analysis of comments made while participants (n = 17) walked
through the house (Den Ouden, 2015) demonstrated greater
frequency of comments regarding the realism of the environment
in the implausible condition (54% of total comments) vs. the
plausible (0.02% of total comments).
To manipulate immersion, participants either wore an Oculus
Rift R© (high immersion, n= 102) or saw the virtual house on a 23
inch TN computer monitor (low immersion, n= 93).
Finally, to manipulate cognitive load, we applied the Gilbert
Digit Rehearsal Task (Gilbert and Hixon, 1991). Participants
in the group with high cognitive load (n = 99) were told to
memorize a nine-digit number and were shown this number for
30 s after being transferred onto the second floor of the virtual
house. Participants in the group with low cognitive load (n= 96)
were simply told to walk through the environment.
Measures
Spatial Presence. We used the eight item Spatial Presence
Experience Scale (SPES, Hartmann et al., 2015) to assess spatial
presence self-location using a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree (e.g., “It
seemed as though my self was present in the environment,” M
= 4.40, SD = 1.54, α = 0.96). Spatial presence possible actions
were also measured with the eight items version of the SPES (e.g.,
“I had the impression that I could act in the environment,” M =
3.87, SD= 1.46, α = 0.93).
Manipulation Check. To assess the perceived plausibility of the
VR, we created three items (e.g., “The rooms I walked through
are very similar to rooms in real life,” M = 4.05, SD = 1.73, α
= 0.84). Participants could indicate their (dis-)agreement on a
seven-point Likert scale. A principal component analysis yielded
a single factor (explained variance: 76.56%, loadings ranging
from .93 to 77).
RESULTS
To test the success of our plausibilitymanipulation, we conducted
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the three experimental
factors (i.e., plausibility, immersion, and cognitive load) as
independent variables, all two-way interactions and the three-
way interaction, and perceived plausibility as the dependent
variable. Only the plausibility manipulation had a significant
effect on perceived plausibility: F(1, 186) = 83.61, p < 0.001,
η
2
part = 0.31. None of the other independent variables nor
any interaction term had an effect on perceived plausibility
(all Fs < 1).
Next, we examined the effect of the plausibility manipulation
on (1) spatial presence self-location and (2) spatial presence
possible actions by conducting two ANOVAs including the three
experimental factors, as well as the two-way and the three-
way interaction terms. As expected, the immersion manipulation
(high immersion/Oculus Rift vs. low immersion/screen) had
a significant effect on both spatial presence self-location [F(1,
187) = 25.40, p < 0.001, η2part = 0.12] and spatial presence
possible actions [F(1, 187) = 4.93, p = 0.03, η2part = 0.03]
with higher values in the high immersion/Oculus Rift condition
(high immersion/Oculus Rift: Mself−location = 4.98, SDself−location
= 1.56, Mpossibleactions = 4.10, SDpossibleactions = 1.51; low
immersion/screen: Mself−location = 3.85, SDself−location = 1.32,
Mpossibleactions = 3.63, SDpossibleactions = 1.37). There was no
significant effect of the cognitive load manipulation on self-
location [F(1, 187)= 2.93, p= 0.08, η2part = 0.02] or on possible
actions [F(1, 187)= 3.06, p= 0.08, η2part = 0.02].
More importantly, contrary to H1, plausibility did not affect
spatial presence self-location [F(1, 187)= 0.06, p= 0.81, η2part =
0.00] or spatial presence possible actions [F(1, 187) = 0.02, p =
0.88, η2part = 0.00]. We also did not observe any significant two-
way interaction or three-way interaction affecting self-location or
possible actions, which rejects H2 and H3.
We also conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff-Test. More
specifically, we tested whether we could reject the null-
hypothesis that the residuals of the dependent variables
in the model are normally distributed. According to this
test, the residuals of spatial presence self-location are likely
to be normally distributed, as the test did not show a
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significant result (p = 0.200). The test for spatial presence
possible actions showed a significant result (p = 0.049),
which indicates that the residuals are likely not to be
normally distributed. Therefore, in terms of spatial presence
possible action, the result of the ANOVA has to be treated
with caution.
Next, to further scrutinize the null-effect regarding H1, we
examined whether the means of spatial presence self-location
and possible actions were indeed equal across the plausibility
manipulation (Weber and Popova, 2012). More precisely, with
an equivalence test, we examined whether the means for spatial
presence self-location and possible actions were not (as we
initially expected) smaller in the implausible VR than in the
plausible VR condition. In other words, with equivalence tests
the null-hypothesis can be tested. We conducted a one-tailed
equivalence test, in which we set the initially expected effect
size delta to 0.15, based on a meta-analysis by Cummings
and Bailenson (2015). More specifically, we took the weighted
effect size (r) for the immersion variable “image quality” in
the study by Cummings and Bailenson (2015) because this
variable is the closest to what we manipulated in our study,
namely external consistency. The equivalence test was significant
for spatial presence self-location [t(193) = 0.26, 1 = 0.15,
peq = 0.04] and for spatial presence possible actions [t(193)
= −0.07, 1 = 0.15, peq = 0.03]. Thus, we can conclude
that the means of both dimensions of spatial presence are
indeed equivalent across the two plausibility groups, again
rejecting H1.
DISCUSSION
The present experiment examined the effect of plausibility
violations within a virtual environment on users’ sense of
spatial presence. We conceptualized the experience of spatial
presence in a mediated environment as a perceptual system 1
process that potentially can be affected by higher-order system 2
processes, such as plausibility assessments. Participants who were
exposed to the implausible VR environment in the present study
reported significantly lower levels on the perceived plausibility
measure. However, this successful manipulation had no effect
on either dimension of spatial presence (i.e., self-location and
possible actions). Additional equivalence tests showed that the
means in the group encountering an implausible VR were not
smaller than the means in the group exposed to a plausible VR.
Participants in the present study seemed to successfully integrate
encountered anomalies into their experience, thus leaving their
presence sensation untouched (see also Spagnolli and Gamberini,
2002)—or they simply did not succeed in regulating their
presence experience in light of plausibility violations. From this
perspective, the observed “null-effect” confirms the perspective
of scholars advocating for the cognitive impenetrability of
perceptual sensations (e.g., Tryon, 2014).
The experimental study also included immersion and
cognitive load as experimental factors and potential moderators
that have been shown to affect perceptual and higher-order
cognitive processes. A substantial body of studies has provided
evidence that immersion affects spatial presence (for an
overview, see Cummings and Bailenson, 2015), and we expected
that the presumed presence-regulating effect of implausibility
on presence might be diminished if sensations of spatial
presence were particularly strong, due to a highly immersive
environment. Similarly, research has shown that cognitive load
can affect information processing, such as attention or visual
perception (Sweller, 1994), and we expected that cognitive
load might interfere with the presumed presence-regulating
effect of implausibility. However, none of the two related two-
way interactions were significant. Accordingly, we found no
evidence for these two mechanisms. This finding could imply
that plausibility operations might not necessarily represent a
cognitively taxing system 2 activity. To the extent this is true, it
might be more fruitful to consider the interplay of plausibility
operations and presence as an interplay between cognition and
perception rather than two information processing systems.
In summary, the results of the present experiment thus
suggest that plausibility (as we defined and manipulated it) has
no impact on the sensation of presence; users seem to feel
equally present in plausible or implausible virtual environments,
perceived implausibility does not seem to regulate the presence
sensation. As discussed in sections one and two, research on
the relationship between presence and plausibility produced
mixed results. For instance, correlational studies (e.g., Lombard
et al., 2009; Shafer et al., 2011) repeatedly found relationships
between the experience of presence and perceived plausibility,
whereas experimental studies sometimes found effects (e.g.,
Krcmar et al., 2011) and sometimes did not (e.g., Regenbrecht
and Schubert, 2002). As mentioned above, differences in both
conceptualizations and operationalizations of plausibility have to
be taken into account. In our study, we manipulated external
plausibility and did not find an effect of this manipulation on
spatial presence. Notably, the results of our study are in line
with Slater’s (2009) argument that place illusions (referred to
as spatial presence in this manuscript) and plausibility illusions
(what we would call perceived plausibility in this manuscript) are
two orthogonal factors.
Nevertheless, anecdotal reports from and non-systematic
observations of some of the participants suggested that some
specific implausible responses of the VR might in fact reduce
the sensation of spatial presence. Accordingly, perhaps in our
experimental study we focused on manipulating a specific type of
(im)plausibility (namely external plausibility) that does not affect
presence, while other types of implausibility exist that actually
may interfere with the presence experience. For example, akin to
initial findings from Garau et al. (2008), one could distinguish
more carefully external plausibility violations that disturb the
spatial makeup of the VE (e.g., real glitches or incomprehensible
spatial information) from external plausibility violations that are
spatially correct (like the flipped environment displayed in the
present study). The former plausibility might diminish presence,
while the latter might not. However, as a caveat, the processing
of other types of plausibility might not require cognitive load,
hence they are unlikely candidates for system 2 processing
as we proposed here. For example, spatial glitches represent
a type of implausibility that directly interrupts the perceptual
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system 1 processing, thus weakening presence. Users might not
need to engage in effortful system 2 processing to reflect on
incomprehensible spatial information in order to down-regulate
presence subsequently. Accordingly, although spatial glitches
might be more effective in breaking presence than other external
plausibility violations, they might be less suited to illuminate the
present dual-system idea and logic of cognitive penetrability of
spatial presence addressed in the this research.
To explore the possibility that other types of plausibility
violations exist that do affect presence, future research could
complement the results of the present quantitative experimental
study with insights from a qualitative think-aloud study that
designed to illuminate the interplay of plausibility and presence
in a more fine-grained manner, similar to Den Ouden (2015).
Or, similar to Lee et al. (2019), a content analytic review of
participants’ walk-through may reveal individual idiosyncrasies
which may better explain individual responses to implausibility
than examining them in the aggregate. It is worthwhile to also
consider violations of internal plausibility in this context; for
example, an implausible narrative might reduce users’ sense
of presence.
In conclusion, we found no significant difference in the
experience of spatial presence between the low and high
plausibility environment—and this “null effect” adds to the body
of research on the associations between plausibility (violations)
and the sense of being there.
On a more general level, this finding adheres with the
idea that it is difficult to regulate hard-wired perceptual
sensations such as presence based on top-down higher-order
cognitive operations. If this general idea is correct, one
might also speculate that immersive technologies like VR
induce, in general, powerful perceptual sensations in users,
based on hard-wired mechanisms—and these sensations
might remain largely unaffected by users’ more reflective
thoughts (e.g., about any artificiality in the experience). In
this regard, VR would differ from less immersive traditional
media in which users’ higher-order cognitive awareness
that “this is not real” proves to be a powerful mechanism
to regulate induced experiences (e.g., down-regulating
suspense while watching a film). Accordingly, it remains
to be seen to what extent VR users’ awareness of the
mediated nature of their experience (i.e., “knowing that
this is not real”) is still an effective mechanism in shaping their
immediate sensations.
As a final note and limitation of the present study, the
present sample size could be considered as rather limited
given the study’s experimental design (i.e., a 2 × 2 ×
2). However, smaller samples are not uncommon in studies
on presence in virtual environments (see Cummings and
Bailenson, 2015). Also, in addition to the nil-null hypothesis
significance testing, we also performed an equivalence test,
which provides strong evidence for the lack of a difference
between the high and the low plausibility group in terms of
spatial presence.
In conclusion, we believe that our study is a valuable first step
toward a better understanding of the role of plausibility in the
formation of spatial presence.
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